EU migration and asylum law: a complicate picture

EU migration and asylum law applies in a multi-layer legal system:
(i) Geneva conventions regime (expressly referred to by the TFEU)
(ii) Customary rules of international law on the admittance of aliens
in the territory of a State
(iii) Member States ’ (MS) competences
The main sources and institutions of EU migration and asylum law:
- Articles 77-80 TFEU and EU Charter
- EU secondary legislation (Dublin regulation et al.: ‘Geneva plus’)
- ECJ case-law
- EASO (and Frontex)
But public order and national security matters still belong to MS
competences and substantially aﬀect EU action in our ﬁeld
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The ‘Dublin format’
EU asylum regime rests on this basic assumptions:
(i) all MS are parties to Geneva and the ECHR è all are ‘safe
countries’ for the purposes of int’l protection
(ii) all MS comply with int’l and EU standards and obligations and
the principle of mutual recognition prevents any MS to cast in
doubt compliance of above standards/obligations by other MS
Thus:
- Only one MS can be responsible for examining an application for
int’l protection
- This MS is the ﬁrst one where the asylum seeker has submitted the
application or has illegally entered the EU, i.e. the MS in which she
enters the borders of EU territory
- Migrants found in another MS are returned to the ‘responsible MS’
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The missing assumptions of the ‘Dublin format’ and
the ﬂaws characterizing the CEAS
The ‘Dublin format’ apparently solves ‘asylum shopping’ and ‘refugees in
orbit’ issues, but
(i) Migrants ﬂows are not proportional to MS population and wealth,
and depend on geography
(ii) MS mostly aﬀected by migrations are those particularly hit by
economic and ‘euro’ crisis, what reduced their budget capacity
(iii) Migrants are not entitled to move among MS, but EU internal
borders control have been removed by the Schengen regime
Further elements have turned these ﬂaws into a ‘perfect storm’:
- Collapse of many middle east and Northern African States functioning
as ‘external borders’
- Rise of terrorism, but above all
- Inadequate application of the solidarity principle (Art. 80 TFEU)
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The ECJ role in ﬁlling the CEAS gaps…
The ECJ has remarkably contributed to the improvement of the CEAS and
its judgments have been used to recast the Dublin regime. Inter alia
(i) the principle of mutual conﬁdence notwithstanding, a MS is
prevented from transferring an asylum seeker to the ‘responsible MS’
when aware of «systemic deﬁciencies in the asylum procedure and in
the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that [MS]» (N.S.&M.E.
judgment)
(ii) Humanitarian grounds change the criteria for identifying the
‘responsible State’ and oblige a MS to examine an application for
asylum (K judgment)
(iii) Any MS if it so wishes may examine an application for asylum,
notwithstanding the Dublin regime (Halaf judgment)
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… and its role to safeguard minors
In the M.A. judgment the ECJ stated that
(i) Under the EU Charter interests of the child are the primary
consideration of all States; therefore
(ii) «unaccompanied minors form a category of particularly vulnerable
persons»; and «it is important not to prolong more than is strictly
necessary the procedure for determining the Member State
responsible, which means that, as a rule, unaccompanied minors
should not be transferred to another [MS]» è
(iii) «where an unaccompanied minor with no member of his family
legally present in the territory of a MS has lodged asylum
applications in more than one MS, the MS in which that minor is
present after having lodged an asylum application there is to be
designated the ‘Member State responsible’»
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Some improvements in the Dublin Regulation Recast
(no 603/2013)…
In 2013 the EU has largely recast the Dublin regime
(i) the N.S.&M.E., Halaf, K, and M.A. principles have been incorporated
in the Dublin III Regulation
(ii) procedural guarantees have been improved for applicants and
exchange of information between MS interested in the transfer of
an applicant to the ‘responsible MS’
(iii) a ‘timid’ mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis
management has been established, yet onuses are still upon the MS
concerned by the migratory emergency
However,
- asylum seekers or beneﬁciaries have no right to move in other MS
- operational solidarity measures are ‘foreseen’ but not concretely
established
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Article 80 TFEU: is solidarity a mere ﬁnancial issue?
Art. 80 TFEU: ‘The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their
implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of
responsibility, including its ﬁnancial implications, between the Member States.
Whenever necessary, … appropriate measures [shall be adopted to] give eﬀect to
this principle’
Until a few months ago, solidarity has worked exclusively through ﬁnancing
(i) 2007-2013 SOLID programme (4bn €)
(ii) 2014-2020: Internal Security Fund [ISF-Borders Fund (security and
borders control: 2.76bn €) + ISF-Police Fund] and Asylum Migration and
Integration Fund-AMIF (3.1bn €). Denmark does not participate
In March 2016 a proposal under Art. 122.2 TFEU has been issued by the
Commission to establish a permanent instrument entirely funded by the EU
budget to be activated on a case-by-case basis. Will it be approved?
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AMIF implemented
AMIF works largely to ﬁnance national programmes:
(i) 88% of budget allocated to national programmes dealing with
reception and asylum systems (improved administrative structures,
training of staﬀ, developing alternatives to detention, etc.),
measures for integrating non-EU nationals in the Member States and
for voluntary returning and re-integrating these persons in their
countries of origin
(ii) 12% only devoted to real EU programmes
(iii) 6,000 € for each MS accepting an asylum beneﬁciary coming from
another MS
AMIF and ISF are implemented together by Reg. 514/2014: asylum and
external border control are seen as two faces of the same coin
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The new (and strongly objected) relocation
instruments adopted in September 2015
Decisions 1523 and 1601/2015:
(i) 40,000+120,000 applicants having high probability to be eligible for
asylum shall be relocated from Italy/Greece to other MS in 2 years
(ii) In exchange to this, Italy/Greece must improve ‘capacity, quality and
eﬃciency of their systems in the area of asylum, ﬁrst reception and
return’ (i.e. proceed more systematically to migrants’ identiﬁcation and
ﬁngerprinting and apply more rigorously the EURODAC Regulation
(iii) Relocation is decided by national authorities and EASO. No right for
applicants to decide, but parameters e.g. family links, language, cultural/
social ties will be considered
Slovakia and Hungary have immediately challenged these Decisions before
the ECJ: they refuse relocation as a principle. Other MS simply ‘close their
borders’ or threaten to do so for (alleged) national security reasons
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The downsides of a policy based on
intergovernmental and unilateral approaches
The CEAS suﬀers systemic weaknesses due to
(i) Intergovernmental approach characterizing the ‘migration emergency’:
all measures adopted under Art. 78.2 TFEU (Council, i.e. MS)
(ii) Horizontal approach è fragmentation and politically biased decisions:
‘second line’ Member States have reacted through (temporarily?) reestablishing border controls to ‘push back’ irregular migrants, as
allowed by the Schengen Border Code
(iii) Other MS have endorsed unilateral actions: Germany (Halaf doctrine
and open doors for Syrians) and Italy (Mare Nostrum), with EU spill-over
eﬀects
(iv) Fears for terrorism subordinates long-term humanitarian strategies to
national security evaluations, for which MS are exclusively competent
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The EU-Turkey agreement in a nutshell
Purposes:
(i) stop irregular/illegal immigration from Turkey to the EU (i.e. to Greece)
(ii) target criminal organizations’ business model through which hundreds
of thousands of migrants have been smuggled to the EU
Tools:
- Turkey shall take back all migrants reaching the Greek coasts after
March 20, 2016, and take «any necessary measures to prevent new sea
or land routes for irregular migration opening from Turkey to the EU»
- for every Syrian citizen returned from Greece to Turkey another Syrian
will be resettled legally to the EU
- 3 + 3bn € allocated to Turkey under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey
- visa requirements for Turkish citizens lifted no later then June 2016
- Turkey accession process to the EU shall be «re-energized»
- Adhesion by MS to ‘voluntary humanitarian admission schemes’
- Intensiﬁed coasts patrolling by MS, Frontex and NATO
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First assessments on the EU-Turkey agreement
Upsides:
(i) The EU position is (ﬁnally?) common among MS
(ii) No free-riding on migrants by smugglers (arrivals to EU coasts dropped)
(iii) Declared improvement of compliance with int’l standards in aﬀected EU
countries (Greece) through direct EU action
Open issues:
- Is Turkey a ‘safe country’ for the purposes of Geneva? In principle yes
and anyway the N.S.&M.E. doctrine would apply
- Is the exchange between Syrians arriving to the EU and Syrians
relocated from Turkey consistent with Geneva standards? The ECJ has
replied to this question in the aﬃrmative (the Mirza case)
And yet, this is is not the perfect world in which we would like to be and
seems a limited short-term solution (Italy proposed a Migration Compact)
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CEAS as the fairy tale The Emperor’s New Clothes?

The migration emergency is unprecedented, and yet the CEAS has shown
signiﬁcant weaknesses: the image of a united Europe sharing the same
humanitarian values under an harmonized legal principles has been
brutally replaced by
ü short-term (myopic) domestic tactics
ü pursuit of national interests
ü mutual distrust
ü incapability to carry out a cohesive and long-term EU strategy for
asylum and management of migratory ﬂows
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The ‘Dublin format’ is totally unjust and unﬁt
especially for handling migrations by sea

The duty to rescue persons at sea whose life is in danger cannot identify as
‘responsible State’ the MS whose navy has taken onboard migrants or whose
coasts have been reached by them upon their rescue
International law indicates that the non-refoulement principle at sea obliges
coastal States to provide ‘territorial asylum’ to refugees trying to enter their
territorial waters, contiguous zone and prospected disembarkation port
‘Territorial asylum’ grants a ‘temporary refugee’ status, which States comply
with through the re-direction of the refugee to a safe third State. For EU
Member States, the Hirsi judgment adds on to the above obligation an
extended duty also for refugees intercepted in the high seas. It does not,
however, imply an obligation to become the ‘responsible State’ for
processing requests for international protection
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Conclusive proposals for a CEAS consistent with
solidarity (Art. 80 TFEU) and sincere cooperation
(Art. 4.3 TEU)…
The ‘Dublin format’ is inconsistent with Art. 80 TFEU and 4.3 TEU. These
principles mandate
(i) Relocation of migrants eligible for asylum according to objective and
proportionate criteria applied vertically, automatically and no opt-out
(ii) Directly funding by the EU for patrolling seas, rescuing migrants,
processing applications of int’l protection and taking back economic
migrants
(iii) Gradual freedom of movement of asylum beneﬁciaries ‘established’ in a
MS to another MS, under conditions similar to those enjoyed by EU
citizens pursuant to the Directive 2004/38 è principles embodied in
Directive 2003/109 should be amended
Francesco Munari – EU law on migration and asylum

15

… and the unavoidable alternative

The reality is much diﬀerent and the rule of law is mistreated
As a consequence, the Schengen regime might altogether collapse,
with enormous down-sides for the EU
Similarly to the UME crisis, we need a ‘really closer Union’
If this cannot be implemented with 28 MS, then better considering to
re-start a really ‘closer Union’ (back to the old ‘European
Community’?...) comprising only those MS available for radical changes
francesco.munari@unige.it
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